INTRODUCTION
Last year's report noted that regulatory efforts on both sides of the Atlantic, in anti-corruption and procurement, are become more interdependent, as the two systems, U.S. and European, evolve in parallel.
See Coordinating Compliance and Procurement Rules in a Shrinking World:
The Case for a Transatlantic Dialogue, 2013 Gov't Contracts Year in Review Briefs 3 (available on Westlaw). That convergence continued over the past year, as the European Union finalized its new directives on procurement, and the United States and Europe moved forward in negotiating a comprehensive free trade agreement, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP), which would (among other things) address barriers to trade in procurement.
In Parts II and III, this report will review the T-TIP agreement's potential impact on procurement, in the near and long term. The European T-TIP negotiators are likely to demand greater access to sub-central (state) procurement markets, in return for reducing barriers to European markets, such as in agriculture. In the longer term, the T-TIP negotiations may well lead to a formalized process for addressing regulatory barriers to trade, including -potentiallybarriers raised by procurement regulations. Part IV will discuss the pending European procurement directives, focusing, especially, on the "classical" procurement directive, rather than on the proposed directives governing concessions or utilities. The discussion below will review some of the more important elements of the draft European procurement directive, will assess whether those elements may have discriminatory impacts on U.S. exporters, and will ask whether those discriminatory effects could be mitigated by better cooperation between regulators on either side of the Atlantic.
II. THE TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIP (T-TIP)
The T-TIP negotiations, launched in early 2013, are intended to result -if successful -in a comprehensive EU-U. With regard to their own potential agreement, the United States and the European Union held several rounds of T-TIP negotiations in 2013, concluding with a third round in December. At the conclusion of the third round, in a joint press conference, the negotiators noted that work on T-TIP had progressed, see Live TTIP 3 rd Press Conference, available at http://ec.europa.eu/avservices/video/player.cfm?ref=I084931, and the EU lead negotiator, Garcia Bercero, cited access in procurement as one of the three key goals of the negotiations, id. In early 2014, the two sides were to take political stock of the negotiations, and to plan further rounds of meetings in 2014. Id.
A. Procurement Is Pivotal to the T-TIP Negotiations
As the negotiations have unfolded, several points of note to the procurement community have emerged. The first is that procurement is politically very important in the T-TIP negotiations, and the European negotiators have made it plain that procurement is a central part of the European Union's negotiating goals. Published reports indicate that the EU would like to be able to point to negotiating success in procurement, to address concerns from stakeholders that a T-TIP agreement could grant U.S. exporters much broader access to other sectors, such as agriculture. Ironically, the European Union's own macroeconomic study concluded that opening procurement markets would have a relatively small economic impact -much smaller, say, than eliminating tariffs in the motor vehicle and agricultural sectors. 
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imposed severe domestic content requirements on state grantees --for example, Congress tied significant discriminatory domestic preferences to the hundreds of billions of grant dollars that were distributed to state and local governments under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, per Section 1605 of that act.) Turning that prior practice on its head, these Europeans argue that the federal government also should be able to tie open market requirements to federal grants.
D. Grants Rule Traditionally Banned Local and State Preferences; European Suggestion Would Mean Broadening That Prohibition
The European suggestion --that state grantees be required to accept foreign competitors when the grantees procure using federal funds --comes at an interesting time, 
E. Requiring State Grantees to Open Their Procurement Markets To European Firms Under T-TIP May Mean Again Imposing Comprehensive Procurement Standards
A simple commitment to ensure national treatment in procurement under federal grants may not be enough, however. Experience has shown that free trade agreements in procurement must also address non-tariff barriers to trade; in other words, it is not enough to treat foreign vendors without discrimination, if there are other procurement rules or processes (non-tariff barriers to trade) which in practice impede those foreign vendors. To address this second layer of trade barriers, the Europeans may insist that the U.S. government also require state (and presumably other) grantees to follow certain procedural standards in procurement. The negotiators could agree, for example, to require grantees to follow the minimum requirements of the GPAholding solicitations open for a minimum number of days, for example, and establishing independent bid protest systems, see WTO Doc. No. GPA/113, supra (procedural requirements under pending version of the GPA).
Notably, as was suggested above, there is precedent for requiring grantees to follow comprehensive procurement standards, when the grantees procure using federal funds. OMB Circular A-110, recently incorporated into the revamped grants guidance (see above), has long required that universities and other non-profit grantees use procurement systems which meet certain comprehensive standards, see http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars_a110, and historically OMB Circular A-102 (which applied to state and local government grantees) also imposed more limited requirements for procurement. • Institute a code of conduct;
• Make maximum use of open and free competition, with an eye to organizational conflicts of interest and non-competitive practices; • Undertake prior review to ensure that duplicative items were not procured;
• Ensure that technical requirements were clearly and accurately stated, and that "brand name or equal" requirements clearly state the specific features which must be met; • Utilize small and minority-owned businesses, to allow those sources "the maximum feasible opportunity to compete for contracts to be performed under Federal grant funds"; • Use appropriate procurement methods, and not "cost-plus-a-percentage-of-cost" methods;
• Use formal advertising and public bid openings; • Use negotiated procurement only when it was "impracticable and unfeasible" to use formal advertising, and even then to ensure competition "to the maximum extent practicable"; • Limit awards to responsible contractors only, considering such elements as contractor integrity, past performance, financial and technical resources; and access to other necessary resources; The earlier OMB guidance thus set comprehensive requirements for an effective procurement system for state and local government grantees, although the guidance did not reflect all of the elements (such as a bid protest system) required by the current GPA. In the years before the Circular A-102 procurement standards were materially narrowed near the end of the Reagan administration, some local grantees met these comprehensive procurement requirements by adopting an abbreviated version (called an "ordinance") of the American Bar Association's Model Procurement Code. See, e.g., 47 Fed. Reg. 8960 (1982) ("working in conjunction with the American Bar Association (ABA), EPA has been developing a Model Procurement Ordinance for small communities which is based upon the ABA Model Procurement Code for State and Local Governments"); http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/public_contract_law/1982MP_Ord. authcheckdam.pdf (text of ordinance).
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As recently revised, however, the OMB grants guidance does not impose comprehensive procurement standards on state grantees. Per the discussion above, while the revised grants guidance issued on December 26, 2013 includes procurement standards for grantees (other than states), those requirements are much more limited than they were, say, in 1977, and for the most part those more limited standards apparently do not apply to the states themselves (when the states procure using federal grant funds). See § 200.317, 78 Fed. Reg. at 78,631. Thus, if robust procurement standards are to apply to the states and other grantees -if the United States is to address European concerns about trade barriers by imposing uniform and comprehensive procurement standards on states and other grantees when they procure using federal dollars -the revised grants guidance will have to be rewritten to once again extend those comprehensive procurement standards (including, presumably, the bar against state and local preferences discussed above) to states and other grantees.
F. Potential Impacts of T-TIP Agreement on Opening Sub-Central Markets
The European Union's initiatives to open state procurement markets could have significant impacts, in many different quarters. For example, affording European vendors equal access to state procurement markets could increase competition and enhance best value in state purchasing, but could also increase compliance burdens for state procurement officials, and could make it more difficult to use procurement to carry out state development policies. Taking the next step, and addressing non-tariff barriers to trade by requiring state government grantees to adopt uniform procurement standards (as the federal government did in the past), could both enhance competition and increase compliance costs, as states and other affected grantees struggled to bring their procurement systems to the federal standards. In the long term, however, by increasing uniformity this reform could increase competition, transparency, integrity and the flow of commerce across many thousands of state and local procurement systems in the United States -which are, ironically, the same goals that the Europeans have pursued, in implementing their own uniform procurement directives (discussed below).
III. T-TIP Agreement: Long-Term Regulatory Cooperation in Procurement?
The discussion above focused on how the United States might accommodate Europeans' demand that European exporters be given the same access to sub-central procurement markets which U.S. exporters enjoy in Europe -how, in other words, a T-TIP agreement could be used to give Europeans vertical access into the U.S. state procurement markets. A separate issue, however, is whether the United States and the European Union might erect a long-term structure for coordinating federal and European Union procurement rules, to facilitate transatlantic trade in the procurement markets.
While those involved have argued for using the T-TIP agreement to establish a long-term mechanism for cooperating on laws and regulations that may raise non-tariff barriers to trade, see, e.g., http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/july/tradoc_151622.pdf, procurement regulation has generally not been part of that discussion. The European negotiators have instead indicated that the T-TIP agreement would be used to frame future cooperation in other spheres of regulation, aside from procurement. Those other areas of potential cooperation apparently grow, in part, out of ongoing discussions within the World Trade Organization (WTO), to reduce technical barriers to trade (TBTs).
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Procurement need not, however, be left behind. There is, after all, a common expectation that a T-TIP agreement could result in far less discriminatory procurement rules on both sides of the Atlantic, see, e.g., Business Coalition for Transatlantic Trade, Procurement, http://www.transatlantictrade.org/issues/procurement/, and while negotiators have focused on future coordination in other spheres of regulation, this gap in the negotiations seems both unfortunate and unnecessary, for several reasons.
First, the shared economic benefits of coordinating regulatory regimes -a cornerstone to the T-TIP negotiations -are well-recognized. As one study sponsored by the European Union noted:
Focusing efforts on reducing NTBs [non-tariff barriers to trade] is critical to the logic of transatlantic trade liberalization. Different approaches to the same regulatory challenges have the unintended consequence of increasing costs for firms, which have to comply with two regulatory environments, dragging down labour productivity. Negotiation on NTBs provides the opportunity to pursue a mix of cross-recognition and regulatory convergence to reduce these barriers. Compared to a focus on NTBS, just limiting the exercise to tariffs would lead to much more limited, though positive effects.
Centre for Economic Policy Research, supra, at 3.
Second, although the EU and the United States have launched a Bilateral Investment Forum in the wake of the revised GPA, see U.S. Trade Representative, Benefits for the United States from the Revised WTO Government Procurement Agreement, http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/pressoffice/fact-sheets/2011/december/benefits-united-states-revised-wto-government-procur, the scope and agenda of past exchanges on procurement suggest that because those exchanges occur between agencies focused on international trade, not procurement, the exchanges tend to be focused on trade barriers, not harmonization.
Finally, coordination on procurement matters is relatively easy -procurement regulators on both sides of the Atlantic almost always speak the same language (both figuratively and literally), the official rule-writing systems in Washington and Brussels are mature, sophisticated, and inclusive, and stakeholders in both capitals are involved and deeply invested in harmonization. And as the discussion below reflects, the current round of reform in the European procurement directives could have benefitted materially from better communications across the Atlanticwith better cooperation between the two procurement regimes, both bodies of regulation (U.S. and European) could be improved.
IV. REFORM OF THE "CLASSICAL" EUROPEAN PROCUREMENT DIRECTIVE: AN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE ON POTENTIAL POINTS OF DISCRIMINATION AND COOPERATION
To ensure that procurement is integrated within the rest of the European economy, the European Union issues directives covering procurement by governments, utilities and related entities within the European Union. See, e.g., Sue Arrowsmith, "The Purpose of the EU Procurement Directives: Ends, Means and the Implications for National Regulatory Space for Commercial and Horizontal Procurement Policies," in C. Barnard, M. Gehring and I. Solanke (eds.), Cambridge
Reproduced with permission of Thomson Reuters. All rights reserved. (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2011 -2012 , Vol. 14, pp. 1-48; Pedro Telles, The Good, The Bad, and the Ugly: The EU 's Internal Market, Public Procurement Thresholds, and Cross-Border Interest, 43 Pub. Cont. L.J. 3 (2013) . The directives -and we will focus here on the latest available (July 12, 2013) compromise text of the proposed directive governing traditional ("classical") procurement by public entities, available at http://publicsector.practicallaw.com/blog/publicsector/plc/?p=1550 -are currently being revamped, once again. While the current reforms are extensive, the discussion below will address a few provisions from the proposed "classical" directive, to show how they might be used to discriminate against U.S. exporters and how, with richer communications between Washington and Brussels, the directive's provisions (and federal procurement regulation) might be improved in future rounds of reform.
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A. Defense Procurement: Covered by New Directive or Not?
With the drop in U.S. defense spending, the new European directive's coverage of defense procurement is an important issue to the U.S. defense community. While the proposed directive's Article 14 explicitly states that the proposed directive "shall apply to the awarding of public contracts and to design contests organised in the fields of defence and security," the proposed directive exempts those contracts to which the European defense procurement directive (Directive 2009/81/EC) does apply, and then -in an even more curious twist -also exempts those contracts to which the defense directive does not apply.
One way to make sense of this apparently odd scheme is to assume that the European regulators intend to bring the least sensitive defense procurements within the new "classical" directive, to leave moderately sensitive defense procurements within the 2009 defense directive, and to exempt entirely the most sensitive procurements. The following diagram suggests a conceptual model for this regulatory structure. 
B. Exclusion of Contractors (Debarment): A Patchwork of Uncertainty
The proposed directive also opens a hornets' nest of potential problems regarding exclusion of contractors (what in the U.S. system is called "contractor non-responsibility" and "suspension and debarment"). Although federal debarment officials retain broad discretion to exclude contractors under Federal Acquisition Regulation Part 9, and the system is far from perfect, see, e.g., House Oversight Committee Passes Suspension and Debarment Overhaul, 55 GC ¶ 351 (Nov. 6, 2013) , contractors in the U.S. market know that they can (and should) negotiate directly with debarment officials, to head off exclusion by bolstering internal compliance systems and taking other remedial measures.
The risks of exclusion are much less predictable, however, under the proposed European directive. The recitals to the directive, speaking to proposed Article 55, indicate that contractors must be excluded, on a mandatory basis, for participation in a "criminal organisation" (not defined), for being guilty of "corruption" (again, undefined), "fraud to the detriment of the Union's financial interests" (a surprisingly narrow ambit for fraud), terrorist offenses, and nonpayment of taxes or social security contributions. On a non-mandatory basis, contracting officials may also exclude prospective contractors for any "misbehaviour that casts serious doubts as to the reliability of the economic operator." The next recital (44) leaves open the possibility of rehabilitation, based on contractor remedial measures, but leaves it to the individual member states to decide how, and whether, to exclude. In sum, the proposed directive opens a host of potential grounds for exclusion, but leaves the substantive and procedural rules
for exclusion (and rehabilitation) very vague. This, in turn, opens very real risks that vendors may be arbitrarily excluded, or even that contracting officials might try to leverage their discretion by seeking bribes from contractors tainted by bad acts or poor performance.
In this area, again, communication between Washington and Brussels would be useful. There are several different models of debarment emerging around the world: a highly discretionary model, with rigorous but informal procedures, focused first on issues of performance risk (e.g., the United States); a more structured and adjudicative approach, focused on issues of fiduciary loss ("leakage" through corruption) and reputational risk (e.g., the World Bank sanctions process), see, e.g., Christopher R. Yukins, Rethinking the World Bank's Sanctions System, 55 GC ¶ 355 (Nov. 2013) , available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2357691; and, the European approach, which remains a somewhat uneven hybrid of the discretionary and the compulsory, with only loosely described procedures, cf., e.g., Hermann Pünder, Hans-Joachim Priess & Sue Arrowsmith (eds.), Self-Cleaning in Public Procurement Law (Carl Heymanns, 2009) . Discussions between officials in the various procurement communities -especially, discussions including debarment officials and their stakeholders -would be a very useful way to harmonize sanctions systems, and so to regularize the incentives and deterrents regarding fraud, corruption and poor performance.
C. Harmonizing Multilateral Negotiations Procedures with Offerors
The new directive also reflects European regulators' slow -but now more open -embrace of competitive negotiations, such as those allowed by Part 15 of the Federal Acquisition Regulation. Recital (15) to the proposed directive reflects the European regulators' growing enthusiasm for multilateral, competitive negotiations (as opposed to sealed bidding ("open tendering"), which was traditionally the favored method):
There is a great need for contracting authorities to have additional flexibility to choose a procurement procedure, which provides for negotiations. A greater use of these procedures is also likely to increase cross-border trade, as the evaluation has shown that contracts awarded by negotiated procedure with prior publication have a particularly high success rate of cross-border tenders. 
Who May Submit Initially
Any vendor may respond to request for information re: minimum requirements.
Any vendor may submit request to participate in response to notice.
Next round
Those invited may submit tender for negotiations.
Those invited may participate in dialogue.
Exchanges with vendors
Negotiation of anything but min. reqts. and award criteria Authority opens dialogue with selected participants, to identify best means of satisfying needs.
Award on initial? Yes, if warned.
Equal treatment
Specifications may change, with notice. Equal treatment required.
No sharing of confidential information, unless specifically agreed.
Limit bidders?
May limit number; may reduce through stages.
Competitive dialogues may occur in stages, to reduce number of solutions, if notice.
Final offers?
On notice. Dialogue to continue until authority identifies solution(s) needed. Final tenders then requested. Tenders may be clarified; no change to essential aspects of tenders or procurement if likely to distort competition or have discriminatory effect.
Prizes or Payments
Authority may specify.
Here, ongoing cooperation between authorities in Brussels and Washington would be useful, in part so that the European regulators can take advantage of the U.S. government's long experience with competitive negotiations and -equally importantly -so that the competitive procedures can be harmonized between the United States and Europe, to the extent appropriate. Differences in regulated procedures themselves work an artificial barrier to trade, if vendors must learn new procedures when they enter a new market. While there may be sound differences between different competitive procedures, where those differences are not based on necessitywhere the differences are simply products of different regulatory histories, for example -they should, if possible, be smoothed away, to enhance competition in global procurement markets.
D. Material Changes to Contracts -An Argument for Judicial Coordination
Coordination between the two systems should not, it must be emphasized, be limited to regulators. Courts also play pivotal roles in shaping procurement rules, as the proposed directive points up. The Court of Justice's holding in Pressetext, grounded in competitive considerations, is in fact very similar to the "cardinal change" rule long applied by U.S. courts and the Government Accountability Office: when new requirements could have "changed the field" of the original competition, there has been a "cardinal change" to the original contract and so a new competition is in order. E.g., Lasmer Indus., Inc., Comp. Gen. B-401046 et al., 2009 CPD ¶ 77 (2009 . The Pressetext holding was sound, but there is no evidence that the European court at any point consulted U.S. precedent -it seems that the Court of Justice reached the same rule by logic, and by carefully weighing the economic and administrative forces that naturally work through a procurement system. In the future, however, it may be worthwhile if the European courts develop a reliable means to consult their U.S. counterparts, as the European and U.S. procurement regimes continue to evolve in parallel.
V. CONCLUSION
Procurement systems in Europe and the United States are growing ever more closely engaged. The European Union and the United States have launched broad negotiations to create a free trade area, under a new transatlantic trade agreement (the Transatlantic Trade & Investment Parnership (T-TIP)). In part because of special dynamics within those negotiations, procurement has emerged as a critical issue -specifically, access by European vendors to state procurement markets in the United States. Because the federal government insists that it cannot, for reasons of federalism, afford that access directly, the Europeans have suggested that they can gain substantial access if the federal government ensures that state governments, when using federal grant monies, do not discriminate against European vendors. In fact, federal grants guidance already bars certain grantees from recognizing state and local preferences in procurement, and so the European request -to require state grantees to afford European vendors "national treatment" -may require only incremental changes, to bar local, state and national preferences in state procurements under federal grants. The T-TIP negotiations also may lead to long-term Reproduced with permission of Thomson Reuters. All rights reserved.
cooperation between Brussels and Washington on regulatory matters -including, potentially, cooperation on procurement regulation. As the examples discussed above from the new European procurement directive show, ongoing cooperation between the two capitals could make both the European and the U.S. procurement systems stronger and more competitive.
